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In 2014, the workshop ‘The Nature of Word-Meaning’ brought linguists, logicians, 
philosophers and psychologists together to discuss – the title gives it away – the 
nature of word meaning.1 The topic is of importance and interest to all these 
disciplines because the solution to a range of problems depends on getting clear about 
questions about meaning in particular and representation in general. The central 
question of the workshop was how one should conceive of word meaning, if there is 
such a thing. Take a word like ‘cut’, or ‘green’, or ‘dog’. Does it express the same 
meaning in different utterances? If so, how does knowledge of this meaning guide and 
determine correct use? What kind of thing is such a context-invariant meaning? If the 
same word expresses different meanings (in different contexts), does that mean the 
word is ambiguous or merely underspecified? What kind of thing are such occasion-
specific meanings?  
 These and other questions are addressed in this special issue which presents 
four papers that grew out of the workshop. Here is a brief overview of the papers.  
 Most words that we use are polysemous, but what exactly is polysemy and 
how is it represented in the mind? Some theories try to reduce polysemy to 
monosemy, where the proposed single meaning is taken to be abstract or schematic 
(semantically underspecified) and has to be pragmatically fleshed out on any occasion 
of use. A different proposal is that polysemy is ambiguity (that is, words encode 
multiple senses) and the role of pragmatics is simply to select among those senses on 
any occasion of use. This is the issue addressed by François Recanati in his paper 
‘Contextualism and Polysemy’ and his position on it can be summarized by his slogan 
‘Polysemy is conventionalized modulation.’ The appeal to both modulation and 
conventionalization allows him to steer a middle course between monosemy and 
ambiguity. Because polysemy is conventionalised modulation, a polysemous word is 
not ambiguous. Speakers perceive some meanings of a polysemous word as 
modulations of a more central meaning. Because polysemy is conventionalised 
                                                        
1 The conference was part of the AHRC funded project ‘Word Meaning: What it is 
and what it is not’ (AH/I000216/1). We are grateful to the AHRC for their support. 
modulation, a polysemous word encodes not only one unspecific, but several specific 
(related) meanings.  
 The notion of modulation of meaning that figures in Recanati’s paper is also 
central in the contribution from Nicholas Allott and Mark Textor, ‘Lexical 
Modulation without Concepts’. It is standardly assumed that in lexical modulation 
either a concept that determines an extension or a mere ‘grab bag’ of information 
serves as the starting point of a process of narrowing/broadening whose endpoint is an 
occasion specific meaning. But if the occasion specific meaning is just a sub- or 
super- concept of the concept that was our starting point, the new concept might need 
further modulation to fit the situation. The process of modulation potentially never 
comes to an end. Allott and Textor build on work on semantic externalism to develop 
an account of lexical modulation that escapes this and other problems. Their idea is 
that in lexical modulation we aim to conform to our linguistic ancestors as well as our 
contemporaries and in order to do so we may need to revise things that we 
unthinkingly took for granted when we were inducted into the use of a word. 
Concepts play no explanatory role in lexical modulation. Instead, the notion that does 
the work is conformity with prior use.  
In their contribution, ‘What do Words do for us?’, Ronnie Cann and Ruth 
Kempson approach the issue of word meaning from the perspective of their Dynamic 
Syntax framework. They focus on the common conversational phenomenon of split 
utterances (one person starts a sentence and another finishes it), and ask what the 
meaning of a word must be so as to allow such interactions. Their answer is that a 
word encodes a ‘procedure’, that is, an instruction to build a partial mental 
representation which then serves as the starting point for further construction such 
that different speakers can jointly build up a structured representation of utterance 
content. They explore the variety of structure-building actions that different word 
types - verbs, nouns, pronouns, quantifiers, adjectives, connectives, and others – 
contribute to the dynamic incremental processes of utterance parsing and production. 
On their account, the conceptual content associated with a word on an occasion of use 
is always ad hoc and need not be identical across the interlocutors. It is the result of 
the word’s procedural component interacting with a wealth of general and specific 
knowledge, including each individual’s stored traces of past uses of the word, all 
constrained by standard pragmatic principles of conversational relevance.   
 Charles Travis’ rich paper ‘Views of my Fellow’s Thinking’ explores what we 
can learn from the ‘authoring tools model’ about the meaning of words. According to 
this model, words of a language are tools that have a dedicated function, namely to 
make recognizable how speakers of this language represent the world. An assertoric 
sentence is a dedicated tool for making recognizable how a speaker represents the 
world as being. Travis connects the authoring tools model with Frege’s notion of a 
thought. An assertoric sentence is a dedicated tool for making recognizable the 
thought that a speaker puts forth as true on an occasion. Now, he claims, the same 
assertoric sentence can on the same occasion be correctly used to make recognizable 
that the speaker puts forth the thought that p as well as the different thought that q. 
Hence, we cannot provide a finite ‘recipe’ that determines which thought a speaker 
puts forth as true when uttering one and the same sentence on an occasion. If such a 
recipe is a meaning, Travis is sceptical that there are any meanings. He takes the 
phenomenon of utterances of sentences making recognizable how the speaker 
represents the world to be theory resistant. Now many philosophers and linguists take 
their goal precisely to provide such a theory. If Travis is right, they need to change 
their theoretical ambition or reject the view that language is a dedicated tool for 
making recognizable how the speaker represents the world. 
  
The question about the nature of word meaning is fundamental and of importance to 
several disciplines. How best to answer it is currently a matter of lively debate. We 
hope that the contributions in this volume show the reader what is at stake in this 
debate and present interesting possible approaches to it. 
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